Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom: Professor Robert Rodes and the Church-State Nexus by Garnett, Richard W.




Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom: Professor
Robert Rodes and the Church-State Nexus
Richard W. Garnett
Notre Dame Law School, rgarnett@nd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard W. Garnett, Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom: Professor Robert Rodes and the Church-State Nexus, 22 J. L. & Religion 503
(2006-2007).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/725
PLURALISM, DIALOGUE, AND FREEDOM:
PROFESSOR ROBERT RODES AND THE CHURCH-STATE
NEXUS
Richard W Garnett
President George H.W. Bush caused a few chuckles-and, more
than likely, a few groans-when, out on the trail during the 1988
presidential campaign, he recalled being shot down over the South
Pacific in World War II:
Was I scared floating in a little yellow raft off the coast of an
enemy-held island, setting a world record for paddling? Of course
I was. What sustains you in times like that? Well, you go back to
fundamental values. I thought about Mother and Dad and the
strength I got from them-and God and faith and the separation of
Church and State.'
Mother, Dad, God, faith-"and the separation of church and state."
This train of thought probably strikes us as a bit absurd. And yet, it is
entirely American. That "God" and "faith" could not be invoked by the
future President, as "fundamental values," without the addition of "the
separation of church and state" speaks volumes about how we
Americans think about the content and implications of religious
freedom, our "first freedom."2  Indeed, Professor Daniel Dreisbach
observed not long ago that "[n]o metaphor in American letters has had a
greater influence on law and policy than Thomas Jefferson's 'wall of
separation between church and state."' 3  For many Americans, this
metaphor supplies-in Professor Philip Hamburger's words-the
* John Cardinal O'Hara, C.S.C., Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Indiana. I am grateful to Kyle Duncan, Bob Rodes, Nelson Tebbe, Nicole Garnett,
Kathleen Brady, and Rob Vischer for their comments and suggestions. Thanks are also due to
Professor Rodes and his brilliant wife Jeanne for their friendship and inspiration.
1. Cullen Murphy, War Is Heck, Wash. Post A21 (Apr. 8, 1988). See also David Shribman,
Bush, Dole Butt Heads a Little Harder as Top Contenders Hone Tough Images, Wall St. J. 54
(Jan. 11, 1988).
2. Remarks at James Madison High School in Vienna Virginia, 2 Pub. Papers 1075, 1076
(July 12, 1995); see also e.g. Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America
to the Passage of the First Amendment (Oxford U. Press 1986); Michael W. McConnell, Why Is
Religious Liberty the "First Freedom "?, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1243 (2000).
3. Daniel L. Dreisbach, Origins and Dangers of the "Wall of Separation '" Between Church
and State, 35 Imprimis 1, 1 (Oct. 2006).
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"authoritative interpretation" of the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses; and "vast numbers of [us] have come to understand [our]
religious freedom in terms of Jefferson's phrase. As a result, Jefferson's
words often seem more familiar than the words of the First Amendment
itself."4
The idea of church-state "separation" and the image of a "wall" are
at the heart of nearly every citizen's and commentator's thinking about
law and religion, and about faith and public life.5 Unfortunately, the
inapt image often causes great confusion about the important idea.
Certainly, as then-Justice William Rehnquist once observed, the "wall"
metaphor has "proved all but useless as a guide to sound constitutional
adjudication." 6 Of course, to say this is not to question the importance
to religious and political freedom of distinguishing the institutions and
authorities of religion from those of government. Nor is it to deny that
this distinction was important to many of those who drafted and ratified
the First Amendment, or to doubt its importance to sound constitutional
doctrine.7  It is to worry, though-and to regret-that what should be
regarded as an important feature of religious freedom under
constitutionally limited government too often serves simply as a slogan,
and is too often employed as a rallying cry, not for the distinctiveness
and independence of religious institutions, but for the marginalization
and privatization of religious faith.8
How, then, should we understand church-state "separation"? What
is the connection between separation, well understood, and religious
freedom? What is the place, or role, of religious faith, believers, and
4. Philip Hamburger, Separation and Interpretation, 18 J. L. & Pol. 7, 7 (2002). See also
Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 1 (Harv. U. Press 2002) ("Jefferson's words
seem to have shaped the nation.") [hereinafter Hamburger, Church and State].
5. See e.g. Dreisbach, supra n. 3, at I ("For many Americans, this metaphor has supplanted
the actual text of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and it has become the locus
classicus of the notion that the First Amendment separated religion and the civil state, thereby
mandating a strictly secular polity."); Hamburger, Church and State, supra n. 4, at 1 ("Jefferson's
phrase... provides the label with which vast numbers of Americans refer to their religious
freedom.").
6. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7. See e.g. John Witte, Jr., Religion and the American Constitutional Experiment: Essential
Rights and Liberties 48-50 (Westview Press 2000) (noting that "separation of church and state
guarantees 'ecclesiastical purity and liberty'-the independence and integrity of the internal
processes of religious bodies").
8. Cf e.g. John Witte Jr., God's Joust, God's Justice: Law and Religion in the Western
Tradition 160-162 (William B. Eerdmans Publg. Co. 2006) (discussing the "separation and
cooperation" of church and state in American Puritan thought and practice); Hamburger, Church
and State, supra n. 4, at 2-3 (contrasting "a differentiation or distinction between church and
state" with "something more dramatic-a distance, segregation, or absence of contact between
church and state").
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institutions in the political community governed by our Constitution?
With respect to these and so many other interesting and important
questions, the work of Professor Robert Rodes has been and remains a
help, a challenge, and an inspiration.
1.
Professor Rodes is my teacher, colleague, and friend. It is a gift
and a pleasure working with and learning from him at the Notre Dame
Law School. He welcomed me warmly when I arrived, as a new law
teacher in 1999, and he has guided and encouraged me ever since.
Certainly, his "blood is in the bricks" of the community of learning and
lawyers which he has served and shaped for five decades. His
generosity, charity, curiosity, and decency have been and are a blessing
and an inspiration to so many scholars, students, lawyers, and clients.
He has made the Law School and its Christian mission of scholarship
and formation his vocation, and all of us who are connected to or care
about that mission owe him our respect and thanks.
It is particularly appropriate that the Journal of Law and Religion is
honoring Professor Rodes's work and achievements. For half a century,
he has written thoughtfully, engagingly, and provocatively about an
imposingly broad and diverse range of subjects: 9 legal ethics' ° and
liberation theology," symbolic logic 2 and symbolist jurisprudence, 3
chastity 4 and the Church of England, 5 Catholic universities 6 and canon
law,' 7  and-of course-workman's compensation for maritime
employees.' 8 And, running through this entire body of work has been a
9. See generally Thomas L. Shaffer, The Christian Jurisprudence of Robert E. Rodes, Jr., 73
Notre Dame L. Rev. 737 (1998).
10. See e.g. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Forming an Agenda-Ethics and Legal Ethics, 77 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 977 (2002).
11. See e.g. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Pilgrim Law (U. Notre Dame Press 1998) [hereinafter
Rodes, Pilgrim Law]; Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Law and Liberation (U. Notre Dame Press 1986).
12. See e.g. Robert E. Rodes, Jr. & Howard Pospesel, Premises and Conclusions: Symbolic
Logic for Legal Analysis (Prentice Hall 1997).
13. See e.g. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., A Prospectus for a Symbolist Jurisprudence, 2 Nat. L.
Forum 88 (1957).
14. See e.g. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On Law and Chastity (Carolina Academic Press 2006).
15. See e.g. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Pluralist Establishment: Reflections on the English
Experience, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 867 (1991).
16. See e.g. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Catholic Universities and the New Pluralism, in The
Challenge and Promise of a Catholic University 305 (Theodore M. Hesburgh ed., U. Notre Dame
Press 1994).
17. See e.g. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., The Canon Law as a Legal System-Function, Obligation,
and Sanction, 9 Nat. L. Forum 45 (1964).
18. See e.g. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Workmen's Compensation for Maritime Employees:
Obscurity in the Twilight Zone, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 637 (1955).
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sustained conversation about law and religion, faith and politics, church
and state.19
Professor Rodes's thinking about these matters is rich, prescient,
and distinctive. I could not begin to do it justice here, and there is no
point in pretending that this is merely because of space constraints.
Indeed, as a relatively junior law teacher who also studies and writes
about law and religion, I am humbled, and a bit intimidated, by the
opportunity to address and engage the contributions of a scholar whom I
first encountered through an approving citation in John Courtney
Murray's landmark 1960 book, We Hold These Truths,2" and whose first
published article is a comment on what were then the recently decided
Everson and McCollum decisions.2'
That said, this essay is an appreciation, interpretation, and
application of Professor Rodes's church-state work. In particular, it
contrasts the church-state "nexus" that he has explored and explained
with Jefferson's misleading but influential "wall" metaphor. After
identifying and discussing a few of the more salient features of this
"nexus," it closes with some thoughts about how the leading themes in
Rodes's law-and-religion writing can help us better understand and
negotiate one of today's most pressing religious freedom problems. But
first, a brief review of how the "wall" image came to occupy the church-
state field will set the scene for the discussion that follows.
II.
As Professor John Witte has noted, the "wall of separation" has, in
public law and in public discourse, proved far more "serpentine"-both
in the sense of winding and twisting, and in the Edenic sense of
"seductively simple"-than many who invoke it appreciate.22 Where did
19. See Shaffer, supra n. 9, at 757 ("Much of Rodes's scholarship has been in the field
American legal academics call 'the law of church and state."').
20. In a discussion of the "School Question," Murray observed that
[t]he public school system still, of course, merits strong defense, the more so as it
gradually succeeds in relating itself realistically to the religious realities of the United
States. But the old dual pattern is out of touch with contemporary socio-religious reality.
The notion of "public education" as meaning a unitary and monolithic school system
which singly and alone is entitled to public support has been rightly called (by Mr.
Robert E. Rodes, Jr.) "an aberration in the general picture of our society, which is
pluralistic."
John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition
147 (Sneed & Ward 1960).
21. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Religious Education and the Historical Method of Constitutional
Interpretation-A Review Article, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 682 (1955).
22. Witte, supra n. 8, at 209.
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it come from?
Certainly, the idea of a distinction between the church and the
political authorities, between what Calvin called the "spiritual kingdom"
and the "political kingdom," between believers and the world, between
the City of God and the City of Man, is much older than the American
Constitution and long predates those Enlightenment thinkers widely
thought to have conceived it.23  In Professor Witte's words, although
"[s]eparation of Church and state is often regarded as a distinctly
American and relatively modem invention[,]" it is, in fact, "an ancient
Western teaching rooted in the Bible. 24 Christ's followers were taught
to "repay to Caesar what belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to
God";21 Pope Gelasius instructed the Emperor Anastasius that "[t]here
are indeed ... two powers by which this world is chiefly ruled";26 Pope
Boniface VIII identified "two swords-a spiritual ... and a temporal"
(and claimed them both);27 and Roger Williams contrasted the "Garden
of the Church and the Wilderness of the world. 28 And so on.29
For present purposes, though-that is, for the purpose of tracing
the importation into the Constitution of a "wall of separation" between
church and state-we can begin the story in October of 1801. The
Baptist Association of Danbury, Connecticut wrote to President-elect
Thomas Jefferson, congratulating him on his election to the "chief
Magistracy in the United States. 3° In their letter, no doubt hoping to
ingratiate themselves and their cause to the new President, the Danbury
Baptists trumpeted their disagreement with Jefferson's Congregationalist
and Federalist opponents who had energetically attacked and scorned
23. See generally e.g. Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State
Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 1385, 1395-1447.
24. Witte, supra n. 8, at 210. See generally id. at 210-224.
25. Matt 22:21 (all Biblical citations are taken from the New Am. Bible). The next verse
records that when the Pharisees heard this, "they were amazed, and leaving him they went away."
26. The text of this letter is available through the Internet Medieval Source Book, Medieval
Sourcebook: Gelasius I on Spiritual and Temporal Power, 494, http://www.fordham.edu/
halsall/source/gelasius I .html (accessed Dec. 20, 2006).
27. Boniface VIII, Unam Sanctum (1302), reprinted in Medieval Worlds 77, 77 (Roberta
Anderson & Dominic Aidan Bellenger eds., 2003).
28. Roger Williams, Mr. Cotton's Letter Lately Printed, Examined and Answered (1644),
reprinted in 1 The Complete Writings of Roger Williams 392 (Russell & Russell 1963).
29. See generally e.g. Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. Cath. Soc.
Thought 59 (2007).
30. Letter from the Danbury Baptist Association to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 7, 1801) (on file
with the Thomas Jefferson Papers Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.),
http://baptiststudiesonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/danbury-letter-to-jefferson.pdf
(accessed Mar. 9, 2007). See generally e.g. Daniel L. Dreisbach, Sowing Useful Truths and
Principles: The Danbury Baptist, Thomas Jefferson, and the Wall of Separation, 39 J. Church &
St. 455 (1997).
503]
JOURNAL OF LAW& RELIGION
him during the 1800 campaign as "an enemy of religion[,] Law & good
order," and noted also that their own "[s]entiments are uniformly on the
side of Religious Liberty[.],' '  For the Baptists, the letter explained to
the President, as for many other dissenters from Founding-era religious
establishments,
religion [is] an essentially private matter between an individual
and his God. No citizen, they reasoned, ought to suffer civil
disability on account of his religious opinions. The legitimate
powers of civil government reach actions, but not opinions. 3'
Jefferson, of course, was "keenly aware of the political
implications of his pronouncement on a delicate church-state issue," and
he replied a few months later in a well considered and carefully crafted
letter of his own, one that reflected not just his views about the First
Amendment and his frustration with the attacks of his political enemies,
but also his own fierce anti-clericalism. 33 He wrote, in the letter's key
and famous passage:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for
his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government
reach actions only, & not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared
that their legislature should "make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,"
thus building a wall of separation between Church & State.
34
Jefferson's letter was published in Massachusetts, shortly after it
was received, but was then forgotten for a half-century.35 (Indeed, the
Danbury Baptists themselves appear to have been reluctant to publicize
the letter or its contents.) 36  It does not appear that Jefferson ever
31. Letter from the Danbury Baptist Association, supra n. 30.
32. Daniel L. Dreisbach & John D. Whaley, What the Wall Separates: A Debate on Thomas
Jefferson's "Wall of Separation "Metaphor, 16 Const. Comment 627, 631 (1999).
33. Id. at 632, 631 ("The surviving manuscripts reveal that Jefferson's reply was written with
meticulous care and planned effect."). The letter's political context and the motives and concerns
that probably shaped it are described in James H. Hutson, Thomas Jefferson's Letter to the
Danbury Baptists: A Controversy Rejoined, 56 William & Mary Q. 775 (1999). See also
Hamburger, Church and State, supra n. 4, at 144-161 (noting that Jefferson "elevated anticlerical
rhetoric to constitutional law").
34. Letter from the Danbury Baptist Association, supra n. 30.
35. James Hutson, "A Wall of Separation ": FBI Helps Restore Jefferson's Obliterated Draft,
57 Lib. Cong. Info. Bull. 136 (June 1998). Hamburger, Church and State, supra n. 4, at 162
("[H]is epistle was not widely published or even noticed."). Professor Dreisbach has noted that
Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury Baptists first received wide circulation in 1853, when it was
included in an edition of his works. See Dreisbach, supra n. 30.
36. Hamburger, Church and State, supra n. 4, at 163-180 (contrasting the Baptists' views
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employed the "wall of separation" image again.37
As Professor Hamburger has explained, the idea of "separation"
between church and state was, during most of the nineteenth century, not
so much a Jefferson-inspired constitutional doctrine as an anti-Catholic
rhetorical weapon.38 However, in the 1879 case of Reynolds v. United
States, a case involving the bigamy prosecution of a Mormon and one of
the Supreme Court's first major decisions interpreting the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses, the Justices quoted Jefferson's letter to
the Danbury Baptists, invoked the "wall" metaphor, and reported that
Jefferson's response "may be accepted almost as an authoritative
declaration of the [Clauses'] scope and effect. . .. "'9
The Court did not return to the metaphor for almost seventy years.
Then, in the landmark 1947 case, Everson v. Board of Education, Justice
Black went beyond the Reynolds ruling and announced that the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause constrains not only the actions of
Congress, but also those of state and local officials. 40 Although a narrow
majority of the Court declined to rule that a New Jersey law allowing
reimbursements to parents for money spent on bus transportation to
parochial schools violated the First Amendment, Justice Black followed
Reynolds in giving Jefferson's letter, and the "wall," controlling,
canonical weight. After a lengthy, if misguided,41 account of the
Establishment Clause's history, context, and meaning, Justice Black
summed up in this way:
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between
Church and State. 42  That wall must be kept high and
impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.43
relating to religious freedom with Jefferson's version of separationism).
37. Dreisbach & Whaley, supra n. 32, at 635.
38. See generally Hamburger, Church and State, supra n. 4. See also Witte, supra n. 8, at
231 ("[T]he principle of separation of church and state became one of the strong new weapons in
the anti-Catholic arsenal."). Cf Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1667, 1679 (2003) (agreeing that, in the early-to-mid 19th century, "separation took on a
new meaning, roughly but fairly summarized as restricting Catholic influence[,]" but insisting also
that "separation" has and has long had many meanings).
39. Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
40. Everson v. Bd. ofEduc. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
41. See e.g. John Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 L. & Contemp. Probs. 23, 40
(1949) ("The absolutism of [Everson]... is unsupported, and unsupportable, by valid evidence
and reasoning-historical, political, or legal--or on any sound theory of values, religious or
social."). See generally e.g. Hamburger, Church and State, supra n. 4, at 454-478.
42. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
43. Id. at 18.
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(Some of Justice Black's critics, though-fellow separationists-
protested that he had done just that.)
44
A lot has changed in constitutional law-and, in particular, in the
understanding and application of the Religion Clauses-since 1947.
Still, and even though many of these changes have been in a non-strict-
separationist direction,45 what Chief Justice William Rehnquist once
called Jefferson's "misleading metaphor ' 46 has become deeply and-it
appears-indelibly ingrained in Americans' thinking about church-state
relations and religious freedom.47 As the Court has moved in recent
years from a no-aid-to-religion understanding of the First Amendment to
a more accommodating view, it has been impossible to avoid warnings
that the "wall of separation" is being lowered, knocked down,
weakened, or breached." Even as First Amendment doctrine moves in
the direction of neutral treatment by government of religious expression
and activity,49 it is often charged that religiously motivated or inspired
arguments, claims, expression, and activism are-if brought to bear in
public discussions or upon political questions-inconsistent with our
commitment to church-state separation. Such overheated warnings and
misplaced charges can inspire errors in response, as when, in August of
2006, Rep. Katherine Harris, a candidate for the United States Senate
known primarily for her role in Florida's 2000 presidential election,
announced that the separation of church and state is a "lie we have been
told" to keep religious believers out of politics and public life.50
It seems, then, that we are nearly as confused about separation as
we are attached to it. There are good reasons, however, for wanting to
get church-state separation right. We should neither embrace nor war
against a mistaken version of the idea. After all, as Pope Benedict XVI
44. See Hamburger, Church and State, supra n. 4, at 463-472; John T. McGreevy,
Catholicism and American Freedom: A History 183-186 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2003).
45. See e.g. Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 230
(1994).
46. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91 ("It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a
mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has
been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years.").
47. See e.g. Dreisbach & Whaley, supra n. 32, at 627 ("No word or phrase is associated more
closely by Americans with the topic of church-state relations than the 'wall of separation between
church and state."').
48. See e.g. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Whenever we remove a brick from the wall that was designed to separate religion and
government, we increase the risk of religious strife and weaken the foundation of our
democracy.").
49. See e.g. Good News Club v. Milford C. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors U Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Cf Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
50. Jim Stratton, Harris' Comments Draw Fierce Reaction, Orlando Sentinel Al (Aug. 26,
2006).
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reaffirmed last Christmas in his first encyclical letter, God Is Love,
church-state separation is crucial. "Fundamental to Christianity," he
insisted, "is the distinction between what belongs to Caesar and what
belongs to God.. ., in other words, the distinction between Church and
State .... ,," This emphasis on distinction is certainly not a call for
disengagement by religious believers, communities, or institutions.52 In
the Pope's view, at least, church and state are "distinct, yet always
interrelated."53
This view seems consonant with American practice and tradition, if
not with "wall of separation" rhetoric. As Justice William Douglas
wrote, in the Zorach case, the idea that the "separation" of church and
state "must be complete and unequivocal" does not and could not mean
that "the state and religion [must] be aliens to each other. 5 4 Similarly,
Chief Justice Warren Burger insisted that the "line of separation" is not
so much a "wall" as a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier. ... " In
the context of the modem, activist, welfare state, "separation" or
"segregation" of church from state-let alone of religion from public
life-seems neither possible nor desirable. Such an understanding of
"separation," and of the content of religious freedom, simply does not
connect with the world we inhabit or with who and what we are.56
III.
As I noted at the outset, Professor Rodes in his law-and-religion
work does not invoke or rely on the image of a "wall of separation," but
works instead with the more nuanced idea of a "church-state nexus."57
51. Pope Benedict XVI, God is Love: Deus caritas est 34 (U.S. Conf. Cath. Bishops 2006).
See also e.g. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, The Salt of the Earth: Christianity and the Catholic
Church at the End of the Millennium 240 (Ignatius Press 1997) ("[S]eparation is ultimately a
primordial Christian legacy and also a decisive factor for freedom.").
52. Benedict, supra n. 51, at 36 ("The Church... cannot and must not replace the State. Yet
at the same time she cannot and must not remain on the sidelines in the fight for justice.").
53. Id. at 34.
54. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952). See also Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution 23 (Harv. U. Press 2007)
("Churches-to say nothing of religion in general---can never be wholly separated from the
state.... The question that matters is how church and state should mix, not whether they will do
so.").
55. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 673 (1984) ("No significant segment of our society and no institution within it can exist in a
vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the other parts, much less from government.").
56. For a detailed discussion of the importance of moral anthropology-that is, of claims
about who and what we are and why it matters-for our thinking about religious freedom, see e.g.
Steven D. Smith, Believing Persons, Personal Believings: The Neglected Center of the First
Amendment, 2002 U. I11. L. Rev. 1233.
57. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., The Last Days of Erastianism-Forms in the American Church-
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A "nexus," according to my dictionary, is a "means of connection; a link
or tie.",58 It suggests a relation, even a symbiosis, between two distinct
things-neither a collapse of one into the other nor a rigid segregation of
the one from the other. The term captures well, then, Rodes's thinking
about church, state, and society. As his friend Professor Thomas Shaffer
put it, "the foundation of [Rodes's] church-state theory is that the two
are so intertwined-so much the remnant of Christendom-that they
could not part even if they wanted to."5 9 This is, Shaffer notes, a
"strikingly unique position" in the church-state field.60
It is one thing, though, to characterize a relation as involving a
"nexus" rather than a "wall"; it is another to flesh out the nature,
character, and implications that "nexus" relation. At least three elements
of Rodes's understanding and presentation of the church-state nexus are
worth highlighting.
A. The "Erastian" and the "High Church"
The distinction between "Erastian" and "High Church" doctrines,
arguments, and institutional forms does a lot of work, and has real
explanatory power, in Rodes's writings on the law that governs and
shapes the church-state nexus. These two terms' meaning is fleshed out
below; in a nutshell, though, "Erastian" suggests cooperation and
overlap while "High Church" suggests competition and separation. "[I]n
every period," Rodes explains, there has been "a certain enduring
tension in the church-state nexus[,]" a tension which reflects, among
other things, the fact that the church as a "juridical presence" has, at
some times and in some ways, been involved and engaged in the civic,
social, and political arenas, "sharing the historical vicissitudes of the
day," and, at other times and in other ways, "stood out against all
historical developments, semper eadem.,,61 This tension manifests itself
not only in the lives of Christians, but also in the institutions of church
and state, the arrangements between them, and the laws that govern
them.62 And, Rodes has often suggested, the distinction between the
"Erastian" and the "High Church" helps us address, if not to resolve, this
tension.
States Nexus, 62 Harv. Theological Rev. 301 (1969).
58. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1120 (3d ed., Houghton
Mifflin 1992).
59. Shaffer, supra n. 9, at 757.
60. Id.
61. Rodes, Pilgrim Law, supra n. 11, at 140-141.
62. Id. at 140.
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Erastus was a sixteenth-century Swiss theologian "who taught that
the church had no proper coercive jurisdiction independent of the civil
magistrate. 63 His name is usually attached to the view that the state is
or should be supreme over, and should control, the church.64 Rodes's
use, however, denotes something slightly, but importantly, different.
For Rodes,
[A]ny approach based on a general unity of function between
church and state can be called "Erastian." To the extent that
Christianity is viewed as a social agenda and a lifestyle for whole
peoples, this unity of purpose will indeed exist: there is no reason
why the public implementation of such matters should not be in
the same hands as other public affairs. Erastianism, properly
understood, is not a subordination of religious to secular concerns;
rather, it is a placing of religious concerns on the same level with
all other concerns of a Christian government.65
Putting aside, for now, questions about what position or approach
best warrants the "Erastian" name, Rodes's definition is helpful in
describing the way "church" and "state" relate, in our society and in
others like it. For Rodes, to suggest that the church is not entirely other,
and not entirely segregated (or protected) behind a wall, is not to suggest
that it is subordinate to or controlled by the state. On the Erastian view,
the institutional church [is] one of a variety of institutions through
which a Christian society conforms itself to the will of God ....
Erastianism is not to be equated with the totalitarian view that
religious institutions are to be subordinated to secular ends. Quite
the opposite, it insists that religious ends are to be pursued
purposefully and efficiently, just as secular ends are.66
63. Id. at 141.
64. See e.g.. Esbeck, supra n. 23, at 1582, n. 710 (stating that Erastianism involves "complete
state supremacy over the church"); Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment
at the Founding, Pt. 1: Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2105, 2189 (2003)
("The technical term for governmental control over the church in the English tradition is
'Erastianism."'); Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The
Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 1047, 1053 (1996).
65. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Pluralist Christendom and the Christian Civil Magistrate, 8 Cap. U.
L. Rev. 413, 418 (1979) [hereinafter Rodes, Pluralist Christendom]. See also Rodes, Pilgrim
Law, supra n. 1I, at 141 ("I have extended the term Erastian to cover any view of the church as
one of the complex of institutions public and private through which Christians hope to implement
an agenda for the whole society in a given time and place.").
66. Rodes, supra n. 57, at 304. See also e.g. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., The Passing of
Nonsectarianism: Some Reflections on the School Prayer Case, 38 Notre Dame Law. 115, 130
(1963) [hereinafter Rodes, Passing of Nonsectarianism] (stating that Erastianism "rejects the
rigorous duality of the church and state in favor of a unified religiously oriented society, whose
religious orientation is the responsibility of its total institutional structure").
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We might think that Erastian forms and approaches would be quite
out of place in a society, like ours, where conversations about religious
freedom and church-state relations almost invariably involve appeals to,
or invocations of, Jefferson's "wall of separation." In fact, Rodes
insists, "the dominant theme in American church-state thinking [is] a
kind of free-enterprise Erastianism. '67 That is,
[a]dhering to the basic Erastian insight that views the institutional
church as one of the many institutional forms through which a
society conforms itself to the will of God, it adds the American
free enterprise insight that sees institutional forms as most efficient
when freed from the inhibiting presence of government support.68
On the other side of the "enduring tension in [our] church-state
nexus," contrasting with Erastian arrangements, are "High Church"
forms, arguments, and doctrines. Here, Rodes means to evoke not so
much the elevated liturgical tastes of Anglo-Catholics as the "vision of
the church as standing over against society[,]" and "as an institutional
embodiment of the transcendence, the otherness, of God .... "69 The
High Church position is that
the church is the institutional expression of what is other-worldly,
holy, entitled to reverence. The state must keep hands off the
church because the church is sacred: to interfere with it would be
sacrilegious.7v
"High Churchmen," in Rodes's scheme, are those who "insist[] on the
internal autonomy of the church under its divinely-appointed ministers;"
they "tend[] to present an eschatological witness over against society
and to leave it to the Erastian to present a feasible agenda for the society
67. Rodes, supra n. 57, at 304. See also id. at 330 ("[Most churches' day-to-day
understanding of what they are about is characterized by an Erastian acceptance of a place among
the various institutions by which an overall and traditionally Christian society underwrites the
pursuit of happiness by its members.").
68. Id. at 304.
69. Rodes, Pilgrim Law, supra n. 11, at 141. See also Rodes, supra n. 57, at 305 (explaining
that the High Churchman
see[s] the institutional church as standing over against society in general, rather than as
constituting one of the institutions through which society in general conforms itself to
the will of God.... The High Church attitude tends to point up the shortcomings of
society, and to offer the Christian a way of dissociating himself from them, rather than of
ameliorating them. In the past, High Churchmanship has sought an institutional witness
in forms that express the independence of the church, and her freedom from the
corruptions besetting rest of society.
70. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., From Pierce to Nyquist: A Free Church in an Expensive State, in
Freedom & Education: Pierce v. Society of Sisters Reconsidered 47, 52 (Donald P. Kommers &
Michael J. Wahoske eds., Center for Civil Rights, U. Notre Dame L. Sch. 1978).
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to implement.",
71
In Rodes's view, we in the United States have "not developed
forms of [the High Church] kind .... [T]he generally optimistic tone of
American society has kept such thinking from gaining a solid place in
the institutional witness of any of the main-stream churches. 72 What's
more,
[t]he American legal structure has also played a part in inhibiting
the growth of High Church forms .... [T]he transcendent witness
of High Churchmanship is hard to institutionalize in churches none
of which can claim a dominant position in the overall society, or,
indeed, any position at all beyond what it derives from its
constituents.73
That said, Rodes has characterized several of the Supreme Court's
church-autonomy cases-including, for example, Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral,74 the Hull Memorial case,75 and Watson v. Jones76-as
protecting a "High Church freedom," i.e., the "freedom of ecclesiastical
processes to move in an area where secular processes cannot
follow .... 7
What's more, several of our more familiar church-state problems
have both Erastian and High Church dimensions. For example, we have
long exempted churches and their works from secular taxes, in part on
the theory that the religious organizations can and do serve "secular
purposes" in and through their work.78 In so doing, we "recognize the
church as one of the institutions through which citizens engage in their
harmless or commendable pursuits[,]" and acknowledge "the support
and encouragement of such institutions as high on the list of proper
functions of government. 79 Our thinking and practice, then, could be
characterized as "Erastian." At the same time, the legal doctrines and
judicial arguments relating to the churches' tax exemptions also have a
71. Rodes, Pluralist Christendom, supra n. 65, at 418.
72. Rodes, supra n. 57, at 305-306. "On the whole, a general denunciation of the world's
ways in America has been left to fringe churches, which form enclaves and mind their own
business, rather than bearing witness against the overall society." Id. at 306. See also Rodes,
Passing of Nonsectarianism, supra n. 66, at 131 ("American nonsectarianism was the product of a
people bemused with its own potential for secular achievement in the development of a new
land.").
73. Rodes, supra n. 57, at 306.
74. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
75. Presbyterian Church U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Meml. Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440 (1969).
76. 80 U.S. 679 (U.S. 1871).
77. Rodes, supra n. 57, at 317.
78. Id. at 317-324.
79. Id. at 323.
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"High Church" flavor, insofar as they reflect a view that churches'
doctrines and activities are special, untouchable by government, and
related to "a dimension of human existence that the Founding Fathers
intended to shield from government intervention.
80
Similarly, both Erastian and High Church themes run through the
financial-support and school-funding cases and controversies. 8' Writing
long before the "Faith Based Initiative" was a glimmer in President
George W. Bush's eye, Rodes noted the "expanded financial
involvement of government in all aspects of public life" and observed
that, as part of that involvement, religious and denominational
institutions are subsidized in all kinds of ways.82 "Needless to say," he
observed, "the justification offered for all this support is Erastian.
Functions in which the public is interested are supported equally
whether or not they are carried out under religious auspices. 83 And yet,
it has long been and still is argued that "the fact that an otherwise
innocuous activity is carried out under religious auspices creates an
overriding objection to public support for it .... " 84 For many today, as
for Madison, it is an "unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation"
to "employ Religion as an engine of Civil policy. '85  This, Rodes
suggests, is a High Church contention: "If ecclesiastical projects are to
be cut off from government funds, it is because they occupy a place in
the lives of men where the concerns of secular government cannot
follow them.,
86
B. Integral and Pluralist Christendom
"Christendom" is not a word or idea that fits comfortably within
our contemporary debates and discussions about law and religion,
church and state. After all, as even a glance at the new-releases table at
the local bookstore confirms, many of our leading commentators see
"theocracy" on the march and everywhere. 87 To refer to, let alone to
80. Id.
81. Id. at 324-329.
82. Id. at 324.
83. Id. at 324-325.
84. Id. at 326.
85. Id. at 327 (quoting and citing Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance).
86. Id. at 328. See also id. at 329 (noting that it is a "central core of High Church ideology
that keeps the state out of the church's central concerns, that guards the borders of the kingdom of
the individual and his God, that saves the means of salvation from unhallowed perversion").
87. See e.g. Kevin Phillips, American Theocracy: The Perils and Politics of Radical Religion,
Oil, and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century (Thorndike Press 2006); Damon Linker, The
Theocons: Secular America Under Siege (Doubleday 2006); Michelle Goldberg, Kingdom
Coming: The Rise of Christian Nationalism (W.W. Norton 2006). For a critical review of the
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acknowledge the continuing reality and relevance of, "Christendom"
will strike many as a first step toward celebrating the Crusades or the
Holy Inquisition. And yet, Professor Rodes has long insisted both that
Christendom persists and that its persistence need not cause alarm. That
is, according to Rodes, one of the characteristics of our church-state
nexus-a feature that must be understood for the whole thing to work-
is that it exists in a particular cultural context, a context of "pluralist
Christendom., 88 What does this mean?
Before the conversion of Constantine, Rodes has explained, the
Christian church was an "eschatological community," one that "waited
confidently for God to bring about the consummation of history," and
that "had no agenda whatever for the wider society. 8 9 Afterward,
though, "it was no longer possible for the church to have nothing to say
about how the state should be run"; the church was "forced... to
develop an agenda for the whole society .... ]"90 The result of this
change was-eventually-the "medieval church-state nexus," which
Rodes calls "integral Christendom."9' This nexus was
characterized by a certain unity of purpose between church and
state, an institutional symbiosis in which the church took
responsibility for offering the state a Christian agenda for the
whole society ... ,and the state took responsibility for making the
church's ministrations available to all citizens according to their
several needs and desires.92
That world is gone, of course, and most people would say "good
riddance!" 93 Rodes has proposed, though, that even after the dissolution
of "integral Christendom," and even in the "state of affairs which people
call pluralism," 94 it is still possible-indeed, it is still necessary-for the
Christian church to accept and fulfill the "responsibility to offer an
agenda to the wider society, and the responsibility for the spiritual
development" of a wide range of people. 95 Our situation today, then, is
genre, see Ross Douthat, Theocracy, Theocracy, Theocracy, First Things 30 (Aug./Sept. 2006).
88. See Rodes, Pluralist Christendom, supra n. 65.
89. Id. at 413 ("The problem with which this article deals begins, like so many other
problems, with the conversion of the emperor Constantine .....
90. Id. at 414.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See e.g. Stanley Hauerwas, After Christendom? How the Church Is to Behave if
Freedom, Justice, and a Christian Nation Are Bad Ideas (Abingdon Press 1991); Thomas L.
Shaffer, Review Essay: Stephen Carter and Religion in America, 62 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1601, 1614-
1615 (1994).
94. Rodes, Pluralist Christendom, supra n. 65, at 414.
95. Id. at 415. See also Rodes, supra n. 16, at 308 ("We are called as Christians not merely to
survive in the world but to help redeem it.").
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called "pluralist Christendom" by Rodes. In this context, there is no
longer a common religion--or even a common religious sense-but
there is
still a concern with the familial quality of human society ....
Within Christendom, there must be an aspiration to fraternal union
among the citizens. It follows that government cannot be a mere
umpire... in the struggle for survival .... It must give
expression to a common desire for a fully human life for all.9 6
It is important to be clear here about what Rodes is not saying. He
is not signing on to triumphalist versions of the America-as-a-Christian-
Nation thesis. He is not calling for a return of political or coercive
power to religious authorities. He is not out to secure assistance from
the state in enforcing specifically religious obligations and devotional
duties. His point, instead, is much more prosaic. For Rodes,
"Christendom" denotes the fact that our political community, along with
several others, continues to be inhabited overwhelmingly by professing
Christians. It might be easy for Christians to regard "governing the
secular community" as a "dubious enterprise" but, nevertheless,
[i]n our society .... Christians are still largely responsible for this
dubious enterprise .... If they are not to relinquish this power and
responsibility, they ought to exercise it with some understanding
of who they are and whom they serve.
97
It should also be emphasized that Rodes intends for the term
"pluralist" to carry real meaning, and to have real bite. Our society is
"pluralistic," period. "The basic trend of our society," he observes, "is
to accommodate divergent views, not to suppress them." 98 There are, in
our state of affairs, a "multiplicity of religious or nonreligious
commitments" and "a multiplicity or moral and social agendas." 99
Although Christendom persists, we have, Rodes emphasizes,
people of many different views all around us, and even if we were
not disposed to respect them, our religion itself would require us to
do so. The question then becomes one of what agenda a Christian
can offer for a society in which many people are not Christian. 00
96. Rodes, Pluralist Christendom, supra n. 65, at 420.
97. Id. at 428.
98. Rodes, supra n. 21, at 690.
99. Rodes, Pluralist Christendom, supra n. 65, at 414.
100. Id. at 416. See also id. at 427 ("[L]imiting the exercise of power and according freedom
and respect to all human beings are not obstacles to the application of Christian principles; they
are the application of Christian Principles.").
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C. Dialogue and Freedom
In the course of defending "pluralism"' 0' as an alternative to
"secularism,"'0 2 Rodes has observed that opponents of the former
regularly point to the "divisiveness" thought to be inherent in pluralistic
structures and doctrines. 10 3 This "divisiveness" provides, the opponents
contend, a compelling reason for a general "privatization" of religion.
To Rodes, however, it is "increasingly apparent that the privatization of
religion is not a permanent solution to the problem raised by religious
pluralism in Western society."'1 4 Religious people will not buy it, and
no surprise.'0 5
Rodes emphasizes not so much the persistence of disagreement and
division as the fact that, notwithstanding the reality of pluralism, we
continue to hold to a "national religious consensus" centered around two
elements, which Rodes insists are "religious" elements: "dialogue" and
"freedom."' 1 6  The acknowledgment and support of this consensus,
rather than a program of privatization, is, Rodes believes, the
appropriate response to concerns about religious pluralism and
"divisiveness." "Freedom," he has explained,
in our society, is an element of a national religious consensus in
that it is conceived of as imposing on the efforts of organized
society a limitation and a direction, both of which are derived from
an essential insight into the spiritual nature of man. This essential
insight is in some sense a religious one.
10 7
The second element of this national religious consensus is "dialogue,"
which refers to "conversation among persons of different beliefs, having
for its purpose mutual understanding and respect, rather than
argument."'' 0 8 Like our commitment to "freedom," our commitment to
dialogue is, Rodes believes, a religious one. After all, he has explained,
101. That is, "a division of society into separate religious 'communities,' each of which is
recognized by the state as representing its adherents in all matters religious or related to religion."
Rodes, Passing of Nonsectarianism, supra n. 66, at 118.
102. That is, the "confinement of the values endorsed by the state.., to those having to do
with the world, or those not having to do with God." Id. at 117.
103. Id. at 119. See also id. at 120 ("This continues to be the theme of some of the most
vigorous opposition to pluralistic solutions, particularly in the schools."); id. at 135 ("[T]he most
telling objection to religious pluralism is that it is 'divisive'-i.e., that it is inconsistent with our
national aspiration to fraternal union.").
104. Rodes, supra n. 15, at 879.
105. Rodes, Passing of Nonsectarian ism, supra n. 66, at 131. Cf e.g. Richard W. Garnett,
Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 Geo. L. J. 1667 (2006).
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[i]ts aspiration to personal rapport among persons of different
religions is born of the recognition of a common spiritual nature
and a common spiritual predicament. Its hope for such rapport lies
in the recognition that God is a Person. 10 9
Now, Rodes does not believe that we can simply extract from this
consensus a neat body of doctrine or clear answers to all of our church-
state disputes. Instead, he sees these two principles-these two
"religious elements" of our "national religious consensus"-not so much
as "furnishing a logical basis for solving problems ... as conducing to
an atmosphere in which they may be solved." 10
[T]he value of freedom and dialogue as the root principles in our
national religious consensus lies in their conformity on the one
hand to what is deepest and truest in our traditional aspirations as a
people, and on the other hand to a recognition of those central
mysteries of human existence to which the most important of
religious affirmations are addressed.
... The profoundest consequence of a national religious
consensus worked out in terms of freedom and dialogue is that it
becomes the concern of every citizen that every other citizen live
out his own deepest commitments to the fullest possible extent. It
is in this context of heightened spiritual awareness afforded by
such a living out that we await the manifestation of divine power
whereby freedom may be consummated in salvation, dialogue in
unity. And it is in this concern for such a living out that we may
hope for a solution to our immediate problems of church and
state.
IV.
I noted earlier Rodes's view that we in the United States have "not
developed forms of [the High Church] kind"' 12 and that, in fact, "[t]he
American legal structure has played a part in inhibiting the growth of
High Church forms." '13  One exception to this general observation,
though, is the cluster of ecclesiastical-self-government or church-
autonomy cases.' 14 Commenting on these cases, Rodes has observed
that the "freedom of ecclesiastical processes to move in an area where
109. Id.
110. Id. at 137.
111. Id.
112. Rodes, supra n. 57, at 305.
113. Id. at 306.
114. See e.g. Rodes, supra n. 57, at 307-317; Rodes, Pluralist Christendom, supra n. 65, at
419; Rodes, supra n. 21, at 689-690.
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secular processes cannot follow seems to be a High Church freedom.""' 5
Indeed, "[this freedom] is less reminiscent of traditional Bill of Rights
learning than of the medieval conception of libertas ecclesiae."
' 16
"Libertas ecclesiae"-the "Freedom of the Church"-was the
rallying cry for Pope Gregory VII's eleventh-century campaign against
the secular powers of the day for papal control over the Church, a
"revolution" that, as the great legal scholar Harold Berman reports,
worked nothing less than a "total transformation" of law, state, and
society." 7  I have suggested elsewhere that the preservation of the
churches' moral and legal right to govern themselves in accord with
their own norms and in response to their own calling is our day's most
pressing religious freedom challenge." 18 While it is settled that churches
enjoy constitutionally protected freedoms to govern themselves and
arrange their internal affairs in accord with religious teachings and
authority, the scope and theoretical justification of these freedoms are
unclear and contested, and the freedoms themselves are increasingly
vulnerable.' '9 In case after case, and in all kinds of ways, the freedom
and autonomy of religious communities today is challenged, even under
attack. 20  Whether the dispute involves the supervision of diocesan
finances by a bankruptcy court or administrative agency, a requirement
that religiously affiliated organizations pay for employees'
contraception, a challenge to religious schools' decisions about the
hiring and firing of teachers, or the usurpation by China's government of
the Catholic Church's ancient right to select bishops, it seems that the
church-autonomy question-and not the words of the Pledge of
Allegiance, or public displays of crosses on hilltops and the Ten
Commandments in parks-is the front line.
This vulnerability is connected, no doubt, to the limited, and
dwindling, appeal in public discourse of "church autonomy." We are,
generally speaking, enthusiastic about autonomy, of course, but many of
us are uneasy about connecting "church" with nomos. Matters are not
helped by the fact that the idea is often understood as entailing the
115. Rodes,supran. 57, at 317.
116. Id.
117. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition 23
(Harv. U. Press 1983); see also supra n. 7, at 11-14 (discussing the "papal revolution").
118. See e.g. Richard W. Garnett, Church, State, and the Practice of Love, Viii. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2007); Garnett, supra n. 29.
119. See generally e.g. Mark E. Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Freedom to Be a Church:
Confronting Challenges to the Right of Church Autonomy, 3 Geo. J. L. & Pub. Policy 387 (2005).
120. See e.g. Diana B. Henriques, Where Faith Abides, Employees Have Few Rights, N.Y.
Times Al (Oct. 9, 2006).
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assertion that clergy and church employees are entirely "above the law"
and unaccountable for wrongs they do or harms they cause.2 And, the
freedom of religious associations, communities, and institutions is made
more vulnerable by the link that many perceive between church
autonomy principles, on the one hand, and-on the other-sexual abuse
by clergy, venality and mismanagement by bishops, and diocesan
declarations of bankruptcy. 122 To the extent the church autonomy
principle is thought to privilege institutions over individuals, or
structures over believers, its appeal will suffer. After all, people today
tend to think about faith-and, by extension, religious freedom-more
in terms of personal spirituality than of institutional affiliation, public
worship, and tradition.1 23  We are-many of us, anyway-like the
woman, Sheila Larson, described by Robert Bellah and his colleagues in
The Habits of the Heart, who described her faith as "Sheilaism.' ', 24 To
the extent we approach religious faith as a form of self-expression,
performance art, or therapy, we are likely to regard religious institutions
as at best potentially useful vehicles or tools or, more likely, as stifling
constraints or bothersome obstacles to self-discovery.
Nevertheless, churches' freedom-that is, their independence from
political control over their internal polity and norms-is a vital
dimension of any attractive notion of religious freedom. As John
Courtney Murray put it, the independence and freedom of the church
long furnished a "social armature to the sacred order," within which the
human person would be "secure in all the freedoms that his sacredness
demands." '25  He insisted that we are not really free if "[our] basic
human things are not sacredly immune from profanation by the power of
the state"'' 26 and contended that it was libertas ecclesiae that supplied the
121. See e.g. Marci A. Hamilton, God vs. the Gavel: Religion and the Rule of Law 8
(Cambridge U. Press, 2005) (contending that "[in recent decades, religious entities have worked
hard to immunize their actions from the law" and "lobbying for the right to hurt others without
consequences"). See also e.g. Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Group Autonomy: Further
Reflections About What Is at Stake 6-7 (working paper, on file with author).
122. See e.g. Marci Hamilton, The Catholic Church and the Clergy-Abuse Scandal: Act Three,
http://writ.news.fmdlaw.com/hamilton/20030410.html, Apr. 10, 2003 (arguing that "the so-called
church autonomy doctrine is not really a legal doctrine at all, at least as far as the U.S.
Constitution and Supreme Court are concerned. Rather, it is an insidious theory that invites
religious licentiousness rather than civic responsibility.").
123. See generally Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State's Interest in the
Development of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 1645, 1662-1665 (2004). See also e.g.
William Dinges et al., A Faith Loosely Held: The Institutional Allegiance of Young Catholics, 125
Commonweal 13 (July 17, 1998).
124. See Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in
American Life 221, 235 (U. Cal. Press 1996).
125. Murray, supra n. 20, at 204-205.
126. Id. at 204.
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limiting principle that could "check the encroachments of secular power
and preserve these immunities."' 127 If churches are not independent of
the state, if they are not free to be different from the state, and if the
government is not limited by churches' freedom, then believers are not
free-not really free-either.128
Returning, then, to Rodes's observation that "[t]he American legal
structure has played a part in inhibiting the growth of High Church
forms,"'
12 9 it strikes me that, in the same vein, we might well worry that
there is not, in American constitutional law, a well-founded commitment
to--or even room for-something like the libertas ecclesiae principle.
This is not to say, of course, that the First Amendment does not provide
meaningful protections for religious freedom. And, certainly, there are
various constitutional doctrines and lines of cases that, in effect, guard
the church's--or, more accurately, churches'-ability and right to
control their internal structure and operations, to propose their own
messages, to administer their own sacraments, and to conduct their own
liturgies. Nevertheless, as Professor Gerard Bradley has observed, the
idea of "church autonomy" sits uneasily in our law and discourse about
religious freedom, because of our "longstanding blind spot...
concerning groups of all kinds. Liberalism," he continued, "adeptly
reasons about the individual and the state, but cannot fathom groups.
''
,30
For Rodes, the relative paucity of High Church forms in American
law and life is a cause for concern, and not simply because it might put
religious institutions in a vulnerable litigation posture. In his view, our
"basically Erastian church-state nexus" is the worse off for lacking a
"relevant and effective institutional High Church witness."'' 31  High
Church institutions, he has suggested, are necessary in order to "stand
witness to the transcendent sovereignty of God," to "proclaim the
judgment of God," and to offer a "refuge ... from a kind of servitude to
the world and its concerns.' 32 In addition, though-and perhaps more
prosaically-it would seem that authentic freedom of religion does not
exist when its manifestation in and expression through the life of non-
127. Id.
128. Gerard V. Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of Church
and State?, 49 La. L. Rev. 1057, 1061 (1989) (contending that "church autonomy" is the "flagship
issue of church and state," the "litmus test of a regime's commitment to genuine spiritual
freedom").
129. Rodes, supra n. 57, at 306.
130. Bradley, supra n. 128, at 1064.
131. Rodes, supra n. 57, at 307. See also id. at 336 (noting that the lack of "an institutional
High Church witness" is "a serious defect in our national life").
132. Id. at 337-338.
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state institutions and communities is inhibited-that is, when High
Church institutions and forms are not able to "provide[] the state with a
limit and the church with a critique"' "-and also, more generally, that
independence for such institutions and communities is both a feature of
and a necessary condition for political freedom. In a free society, such
forms, and something like libertas ecclesiae, will serve as structural
features of social and political life, and will contribute to the
development and sustaining of constitutionally limited government.
Increasingly, though, independent churches are regarded as dangerous
centers of potentially oppressive power, as in need of supervision and
regulation by the state in its capacity as protector of individual liberty
and conscience.1 34  In Murray's words, the "prophets of modernity"
regard the freedom of the church "as a trespass upon, and a danger to,
their one supreme value-the 'integrity of the political order.' ' 135 And
so, Professor Rodes's exposition and defense of High Church forms,
therefore, and his reminder that "[b]y operating outside the practical
limits of power, [the church] witnesses those limits[,] 136 remain
important, and welcome.
V.
I am confident that no one who has been blessed with the chance to
know Professor Rodes and his work is surprised to learn that this
inspiringly humane scholar has, for more than fifty years, been politely
but powerfully questioning "wall of separation" talk for its failure to
speak to the "real needs of real people."'' 37  As I have described-
incompletely, of course-he has presumed and presented a church-state
"nexus"; asked about the role of law, and the task of Christians in
constructing and living in it; and invited fellow citizens of good will to
converse about its implications. As he wrote:
[T]he church-state nexus I have envisioned is not one free from
conflict, or one with all the problems worked out. It has built-in
133. Id. at 336. See also Murray, supra n. 20, at 204-205 (arguing that the "freedom of the
Church... served as the limiting principle of the power of government"). See generally Garnett,
supra n. 29.
134. See generally e.g. Hamilton, supra n. 120. But see e.g. Declaration on Religious
Freedom, in The Documents of Vatican 11675, 694 (Walter M. Abbot ed., Joseph Gallagher, trans.
1965) (available at http://www.ewtn.com/library/COUNCILS/v2relfre.htm) ("[A] harmony exists
between the freedom of the Church and the religious freedom which is recognized as the right of
all men and communities and sanctioned by constitutional law.").
135. Murray, supra n. 20, at 207.
136. Rodes, Pilgrim Law, supra n. 11, at 169.
137. See Rodes, Pluralist Christendom, supra n. 65, at 426.
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potentialities for tension, frustration, or even heartbreak, as any
human situation has. It might be a situation, though, in which the
Word of God can break forth in its own way, or at least a situation
in which a Christian could live by his own best understanding of
the Gospel, and do such work and bear such witness as God has
called him to. This is perhaps all we can hope for from
institutional patterns in this world.1
38
Through his life, teaching, and scholarship, Professor Rodes has been
not just an example, but an exemplar, of how a Christian can "do such
work and bear such witness."
138. Rodes, supra n. 57, at 348 (footnote omitted).
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